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Stabilization Policy in an Economy with Two
Exchange Rate Regimes∗
Sven W. Arndt

Abstract
This paper uses a flex-price open economy macro model to examine the effectiveness of U.S.
monetary and fiscal policies when the dollar floats freely against the euro, but is fixed against the
Chinese yuan. It is assumed that capital mobility is high between the U.S. and the Eurozone, but
low between the U.S. and China. The model allows for short-run price flexibility and imperfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign financial assets.
The focus is on the implications for the efficacy of U.S. macro stabilization policies of China’s
fixed-rate strategy. While many countries have pegged their currencies to the dollar, China is large
enough to have an impact. It is shown that its large size enables China to impede the effectiveness
of U.S. macroeconomic policies. Indeed, while the U.S. is officially tagged as an independent
floater, Chinese intervention is capable of interfering with dollar-euro flexibility and thereby creates outcomes that are more consistent with policy under fixed rates.
KEYWORDS: open economy macro, exchange rate regimes, U.S.-China payments adjustment
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1. Introduction
A widely used approach in modeling the role of the exchange rate in openeconomy macroeconomics is to assume that a country is either a pegger against
the rest of the world or a floater. In that spirit, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) classifies the United States as an “independent floater.” While this is an
appropriate interpretation of (de jure) U.S. policy, it does not accurately reflect
the country’s de facto exchange-rate regime. That regime is a combination of
floating rates against most countries and a fixed rate against the renminbi (RMB)
or yuan, fixed by intervention of the Chinese monetary authority.
The object of this paper is to explore the implications of such a mixed
exchange-rate regime for (i) the effectiveness of domestic macro stabilization
policies and (ii) the transmission of foreign shocks and disturbances. The analysis
is carried out with the aid of a medium-term open-economy macro model with
prices and output both flexible (implying a positively sloped aggregate supply
curve) and with capital mobility high between the U.S. and the Eurozone and low
between the U.S. and China. 1 A final section examines the implications of
production sharing between the U.S. and China for adjustment at the macro level.
It is shown that China’s exchange rate policy has material implications for U.S.
macro policy autonomy and for the effect of foreign shocks on the U.S. economy.
A particularly important consequence is that Chinese intervention, and the manner
in which dollars are recycled into circulation in the U.S., interferes with the
“automatic” adjustment mechanism in the American economy.
Section 2 provides an outline of the model and derives solutions for the
benchmark scenario of a freely floating dollar against both currencies. Section 3
works out the mixed-regime scenario and provides an assessment of the U.S.China policy debate over the causes of the bilateral current account imbalance.
Section 4 focuses on the international transmission of economic shocks and
disturbances in a mixed-rate regime and shows that fixing causes the U.S.
economy to become more exposed to cyclical disturbances in China.. Section 5
examines the implications of production fragmentation between the U.S. and
China and Section 6 concludes.
2. Freely Floating Rates Everywhere
In this section, the dollar is assumed to float freely against both the euro and the
yuan. This is the preferred regime, according to Washington policy makers who
continue to press China to allow the yuan to float against the dollar. The results of

1

For an analysis of some of these issues in a sticky-price model, see Arndt (2011).
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this section will thus serve as a benchmark against which to evaluate the
outcomes associated with the actual mixed-rate regime.
The model in this paper is one that is familiar to and used by most policy
makers. It is based on the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model, but allows for price
flexibility. Hence, rather than being flat, the aggregate supply curve is positively
sloped. The broad effect of this change in structure is to reduce the response of
income and employment to policy initiatives, because some portion of the energy
of policy stimuli is absorbed into price changes. It also introduces an additional
source of changes in real exchange rates.
The basic structure of the model is given by the well-known equilibrium
conditions for the money market, the goods market and the balance of payments.
The money market is specified as follows:
H/P = L(y, i),

(1)

where H represents the monetary base, P is a general price index, y is real gross
domestic product, and i is a nominal interest rate or structure of nominal interest
rates. The real demand for money, L, responds positively to income or output and
negatively to the rate of interest.
Goods market equilibrium is specified as follows:
I(i) + T(y, y*, y^; e*, e^) – S(y) = -G,

(2)

where I is real capital formation, T is the trade balance or current account, S is
private-sector saving, G represents the government budget deficit, y* and y^ stand
for Eurozone and Chinese GDP, respectively, and e* and e^ represent the dollar’s
real exchange rate with respect to the euro and the yuan, respectively. The real
exchange rate is defined as the nominal rate E (expressed as the dollar price of the
respective foreign currency) multiplied by the ratio of the respective foreign price
level to the U.S price variable, P. Investment responds negatively to the rate of
interest; the current account worsens with a rise in U.S. income, but improves
with foreign GDP and improves with a rise in either real exchange rate. Private
sector saving is positively related to domestic GDP.
There are two balance-of-payments equilibrium conditions, one for the
Eurozone, the other for China.
T*(y, y*, e*) + K*(i, i*) = 0,

(3a)

and
T^(y, y^, e^) + K^(i, i^) = 0,

(3b)

2
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where capital inflows respond positively to the domestic interest rate and
negatively to the respective foreign rates. As noted above, capital mobility with
Europe is assumed to be high, while that with China is low.
The aggregate supply curve is modeled as follows:
P = P(y), Py > 0.

(4)

Monetary Expansion
The effects of a monetary expansion in the United States are summarized in
Figure 1. The curves are familiar from the standard open-economy macro model,
except that all slopes will generally be steeper as a result of the assumption of
price flexibility. The steeper of the two balance-of-payments curves, B^B^
reflects the low degree of capital mobility vis-à-vis China. A monetary expansion
shifts out the LL curve. The rise in domestic GDP and decline in the domestic rate
of interest worsen both current accounts and both financial accounts. There is
unambiguous pressure on the dollar to depreciate against both currencies. These
depreciations shift the goods-market equilibrium and the two balance-ofpayments functions to the right.

Figure 1
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At the new equilibrium, B, domestic income has risen, but by less than in
the standard model, because the domestic price level has also increased. The
magnitude of this price-adjustment effect depends on the slope (Py) of the
aggregate supply curve. The rise in U.S. prices implies that the dollar’s real
depreciation is smaller than the nominal depreciation with respect to both
currencies. If purchasing power held before the shock, it no longer does in the
new equilibrium. The relative magnitudes of the real depreciations depend on the
values of both trade and financial account parameters.
Fiscal Expansion
The effects of an expansionary fiscal policy (dG>0) are summarized in Figure 2.
The rise in government expenditures shifts out the goods market equilibrium
function. The consequent rise in domestic GDP worsens both current accounts,
while the rise in the domestic interest rate improves the financial account with the
Eurozone by more than enough to offset the current account deterioration, but by
less than is needed to offset the deterioration of the current account with China.
There is thus pressure for the dollar to appreciate against the euro and to
depreciate against the yuan. This has the effect of shifting the B*B* curve to the
left and the B^B^ curve to the right. In the new equilibrium, they will have to
intersect somewhere on the stationary LL curve. The exact location of that
intersection depends on adjustment in the goods market.
The goods-market line is subject to two opposing pressures, with the euro
depreciation tending to push it to the left and the yuan appreciation tending to
push it to the right. The actual direction of movement depends on the relative
strengths of these two effects. If they are equal, there will be no further movement
of the GG curve and the final equilibrium will, as shown, lie at the point of
intersection of the G1G1 and LL curves.
In that event, the policy’s effectiveness will not differ from that of the
closed-economy case. If dollar-euro adjustment is the dominant force, then the
G1G1-line shifts left and policy effectiveness is weakened. If dollar-yuan
adjustment dominates, then the line shifts to the right and policy effectiveness is
strengthened.
Hence, ironically, low capital mobility between the U.S. and China, which
is to a significant extent the result of capital and exchange controls in the latter,
serves to strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. fiscal policy.
The dollar’s real appreciation against the euro is reinforced by the rise in
the domestic price level. The dollar’s real depreciation against the yuan is made
smaller than its nominal depreciation by the rise in the U.S. price level.

4
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Figure 2

3. The Euro Floats While the Yuan is Fixed
In this section, it is assumed that China intervenes in the foreign exchange market
in order to prevent the yuan’s value from changing against the dollar. When the
Chinese central bank intervenes to prevent the yuan from appreciating, it pulls
dollars out of circulation, which has the same effect on U.S. money supply as
would an intervention by the Federal Reserve. When the Chinese central bank
uses these dollars to purchase U.S. Treasury securities in the open market, the
effect is to offset the reduction in U.S. money supply brought about by the
intervention itself. The result is well-known in the literature on sterilized
exchange-market intervention: U.S. money supply is unchanged, the automatic
adjustment mechanism for fixed-rate regimes is frozen, and the imbalance in the
China-U.S. bilateral balance of payments is made “permanent”.
The shift in the Chinese exchange-rate regime from floating to fixed
requires a change in our specification of money market equilibrium. As in the
previous case, base money is adjusted by the Fed through changes in domestic
credit via standard open-market operations. When China intervenes to absorb an
excess supply of dollars in the foreign exchange market, the result is to reduce
base money in the U.S., very much like a Fed intervention (of selling yuan for
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dollars) would reduce base money. When the central bank of China follows up by
purchasing U.S. Treasuries, the foregoing reduction in base money is offset.2
Monetary Expansion
The effects of a monetary expansion in the context of this mixed regime are
summarized in Figure 3. The initial effect is to shift the LL curve to the right,
which tends to reduce interest rates and raise domestic output and prices. With
respect to the euro, both the current account and the financial account with the
Eurozone deteriorate, thereby generating pressures for the dollar to depreciate
against the euro. This tends to push both the GG curve and the B*B* curve to the
right.
The rise in income and decline in domestic interest rates tend also to
worsen both sides of the U.S. balance of payments with China. In order to prevent
the yuan from appreciating against the dollar, the Chinese authorities intervene in
the foreign exchange market in order to absorb the excess supply of dollars, after
which they convert these dollars into U.S. Treasury securities. In combination,
these two actions maintain the U.S. money supply at its new level.

Figure 3
2

For an intermediate scenario in which the Chinese authorities purchase Treasury securities
directly from the Fed, see Arndt (2011). In that scenario, the automatic adjustment mechanism
continues to function.
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We rewrite the equilibrium condition for the U.S.-China balance of
payments in order to reflect the fact that any imbalance in autonomous
transactions will always be met by an offsetting transaction on official reserve
account:
T^(y, y^, e^) + K^(i, i^) + R^ = 0,

(3c)

where R^ represents the level of dollar reserves held by the Chinese authorities
and where dE^ = 0. While the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the flexibility of
U.S. prices in this model makes room for changes in the real rate of exchange
between the two countries.
Returning to Figure 3, we note that the new LL curve is now the anchor
for the system in the sense that the new equilibrium must lie somewhere on that
function. Suppose that the new goods-market and U.S.-Europe balance-ofpayments curves meet at point B on the new LL curve. The combination of
interest rate and income represented by that point leaves the autonomous U.S.China balance of payments in deficit, i.e., the sum of the first two terms in
equation (3c) is negative. This requires the Chinese central bank to accumulate
dollars in perpetuity or until the U.S. central bank reverses its easy-money
policy.3 The B^B^ curve through point B thus reflects a balance of payments
equilibrium in which a U.S. deficit in autonomous transactions is just covered by
Chinese reserve accumulation.
At point B the dollar has depreciated against the euro in both nominal and
real terms. It has remained unchanged against the yuan in nominal terms, but has
appreciated against the Chinese currency in real terms. This appreciation is the
result of the increase in the U.S. price level.
Fiscal Expansion
The effects of a U.S. fiscal expansion are summarized in Figure 4. The policy
stimulus moves the GG curve to the right, tending to raise income and the rate of
interest. As in the previous section, the rise in income causes both current account
balances to deteriorate, while the higher interest rate attracts capital inflows from
both countries. In the case of the Eurozone, where capital mobility is high, the
improvement in the bilateral financial account exceeds the deterioration in the
current account, thereby putting pressure on the dollar to appreciate against the
euro. This appreciation causes the GG and B*B* curves to shift left. This is the
familiar finding that high capital mobility reduces the effectiveness of fiscal
policy.
3

A later section considers some of the implications for the ongoing debate between the U.S. and
China on who is responsible for and what should be done about the sustained current imbalances.
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On the Chinese side, low capital mobility limits the improvement of the
financial account, so that the balance on autonomous payments deteriorates.
Under floating rates, the dollar would depreciate against the yuan, thereby tending
to strengthen the effectiveness of the fiscal expansion. The central bank of China
prevents the yuan from appreciating by soaking up the excess supply of dollars
and converting them into Treasury securities. The new B^B^ curve through point
B represents a balance-of-payments equilibrium in which the deficit in
autonomous transactions is just offset by reserve accumulation on the part of the
Chinese authorities.
At point B, the dollar has appreciated against the euro in both nominal and
real terms; it has remained fixed in nominal terms against the yuan, but has
appreciated in real terms against the Chinese currency. This additional boost to
the real value of the dollar worsens the imbalance between the U.S. and China,
but it is important to keep in mind that this model does not take into account
possible price increases in China.

Figure 4

Lessons for the China-U.S. Policy Debate
The persistent China-U.S. current account imbalances continue to be a significant
irritant in relations between the two countries. Many U.S. commentators and
politicians tend to blame China’s policy of fixing the yuan to the dollar at levels
that may be too low. High and steadily rising levels of China’s foreign-exchange
8
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reserves are cited as the primary piece of evidence that the yuan is undervalued.
China’s response has been to use the national income identity to argue that the
problem is “made in the U.S.A.” and arises from imbalances in the country’s
public finances and private sector saving and investment.
Although the model used in this paper is not fully suited to resolving the
debate, it does offer some useful insights. First, the discussion in Section 2 shows
that a flexible yuan would indeed restore balance in autonomous transactions. It
does not say that there could not exist continuous current account imbalances,
financed by financial account imbalances of equal magnitude and opposite sign.
The cases captured by Figs. 1 and 3 taken together suggest that a shift by China
from fixed to floating rates would cause the yuan to appreciate against the dollar,
would reduce the bilateral current account imbalance, and would boost output and
employment in the United States.
The discussion in earlier sections has underscored the role of low capital
mobility between the U.S. and China in driving the results. Thus, another way in
which China could alleviate the imbalance problem is to eliminate or reduce
controls on capital movements, thereby allowing Chinese households, firms, and
organizations to expand their portfolios toward foreign-currency-denominated
assets. Paired with a fixed exchange rate, this policy would spread accumulation
of foreign assets away from the central bank to the rest of the Chinese economy.
Among the many benefits would be asset diversification and better returns. It
would sharply reduce the gap between the current value of the yuan and its
equilibrium or market-clearing value on the assumption that there is within China
a pent-up private demand for dollar and other foreign assets. This reduction in the
misalignment of the bilateral exchange rate would not only cool the rhetoric in
Washington, but reduce the threat to small and medium-sized firms in China’s
leading export sectors of a move to greater exchange-rate flexibility.
As for the “made-in-America” argument, deficit reduction in the U.S.
would have results opposite to those discussed in connection with Figure 4: it
would reduce the bilateral imbalance. A rise in private sector saving, which has
occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis, would also have that effect. The
downside of this strategy is that its short-run effect would be to reduce output and
employment and thus to aggravate the economic situation in the U.S.
Finally, when the Chinese central bank recycles intervention dollars by
purchasing U.S. government securities from the public or directly from the
Treasury, it essentially neutralizes the forces that would work to restore balance in
the foreign exchange market. The Fed might want to implement a strategy of
selling Treasury securities directly to the Chinese authorities and thereby make
room for the contraction of money supply that would follow.
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4. Cross-Border Transmission
Most economies have become significantly more open in recent years, with more
extensive linkages among domestic and foreign markets for goods, services, and
assets. One of the consequences may be that shocks and disturbances are more
easily transmitted from one country to another, allowing for the usual caveats
pertaining to transaction, transportation, and communication costs. In goods and
services trade, an important contributor to this development has been the growth
of cross-border production networks, which means that a downturn in demand in
a country like the United States spreads to other countries not only via traditional
“horizontal” channels, but by “vertical” channels along the value-added chain.
In the financial arena, greater market integration means that risky or
contaminated assets held by financial institution in one country, create problems
not only for the immediate parties involved, but for lenders and investors in third
countries, who have provided funding to the process.4 These often complex and
opaque linkages are at least partly to blame for the growing role of contagion
effects.
The nature and extent of cross-border transmission of shocks and
disturbances depends on the exchange rate regime. In the model of this paper,
flexible exchange rates provide significant insulation. In the first scenario, when
the dollar floats against both currencies, a change in income growth in either
China or the Eurozone has no effect on U.S. GDP or interest rates. Its only effect
is to cause the expanding country’s currency to appreciate against the dollar. This
appreciation exactly offsets the stimulus emitted by the growth increase.
When the Chinese exchange rate is fixed along the lines of the second
scenario, however, there is transmission. As shown in Figure 5, a rise in Chinese
GDP initially shifts goods-market equilibrium and the U.S.-China autonomous
payments curve to the right. Under high capital mobility, the dollar appreciates
against the euro, which moves the new G and B* curves to the left. The B^ curve
running through point B represents overall payments equilibrium between the
U.S. and China (while the B1^ curve represents equilibrium in autonomous
transactions only). Hence, the distance between those curves represents the
period-by-period decline in Chinese foreign-exchange reserves. Thus, a rise in
Chinese growth raises U.S. GDP. In this model, at least, the rapid Chinese growth
in recent years would not have had the beneficial effects on U.S. economic
activity if there had been a floating rate between the two currencies.

4

This recalls a feature of the European sovereign debt crisis, where suspect Greek government
bonds undermine confidence not only in German and other European banks who made the initial
loans, but in the U.S.-based money-market funds who provided some of the funding.
10
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Finally, again in the second scenario of a mixed exchange-rate regime,
faster growth in the Eurozone has no effect on the U.S. economy. Its only
consequence is to cause the dollar to appreciate against the euro.

Figure 5

5. Production Sharing and Vertical Intra-Industry Trade
Cross-border production networks and vertical intra-industry investment and trade
have grown rapidly in recent years, helped along by increasingly open and
interlinked economies and important cost-saving innovations in transportation and
communication technologies. As a result, trade in intermediates, parts and
components has seen significant growth relative to other forms of trade. Indeed,
the share of such transactions in total trade has become large enough to affect
adjustment at the macro level. As Arndt & Huemer (2007) and others have
shown, vertical intra-industry trade reduces the sensitivity of the trade balance and
current account to movements in exchange rates. Arndt (2010) has argued that the
growth of direct links between a country’s exports and imports, which are typical
of vertical intra-industry trade, alter response functions and adjustment patterns in
a standard open-economy macro model of the Mundell-Fleming type.
An additional feature of vertical intra-industry trade is that it exposes nontraded goods and services directly to variations in exchange rates and to
competition from abroad. This follows from the fact that production of non-traded
goods may contain tradable components and non-traded services may contain
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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tradable constituent activities. For example, X-ray procedures may not be
tradable, but reading and analyzing X-ray images are tradable activities. Hence,
the total cost of an X-ray procedure will rise with depreciation of a country’s
currency if image analysis is outsourced to a foreign operator.
It is possible to explore the implications of such developments in the
context of the present model by rewriting equation (4) to include an exchange-rate
effect. We assume that the share of components trade between the U.S. and China
is large enough to imply that a dollar depreciation against the yuan shifts the
aggregate supply curve up and we model that effect as follows:
P = P(y, E^).

(4a)

The main consequence is to introduce a direct effect of exchange-rate
changes into the money demand function, so that variations in the dollar-yuan
exchange rate move the LL curve under floating rates. As suggested earlier,
another effect is to reduce the responsiveness of the GG and B^B^ curves to
variations in exchange rates. This makes exchange-rate variability a less forceful
instrument for payments adjustment.
6. Concluding Remarks
Over the decades, many countries have unilaterally fixed their currencies to the
U.S. dollar. Countries in Latin America and in East Asia have been among them.
Since they have tended to be small relative to the huge U.S. economy, their
pegging policies have not aroused much concern in the United States. By and
large, they have not seemed to interfere with U.S. policy-making autonomy.
The People’s Republic of China also unilaterally pegs the yuan to the
dollar, but its economy is large. As the ongoing debate over the implications of
this policy suggests, it has become a major irritant to the U.S. From the point of
view of many American businesses, the “undervalued” level at which the yuan is
fixed gives China an unfair competitive edge in trade relations between the two
countries. The policy also contributes to the large bilateral current account
imbalance and to rising U.S. indebtedness to China.
A third issue, which has received less attention, concerns the extent to
which unilateral pegging by China interferes with U.S. macroeconomic policy
autonomy. This question is examined in the preceding pages with the aid of a
medium-term open-economy macro model in which both prices and output are
flexible. The focus is on the effectiveness of U.S. monetary and fiscal policies and
the transmission of foreign disturbances to U.S. economic activity. A key
assumption throughout is that capital mobility is high between the U.S. and the
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Eurozone and other countries against which the dollar floats, but low between the
U.S. and China.
The model is first solved for the system preferred by the U.S., namely,
universal flexible exchange rates. This is the benchmark result against which the
de facto alternative of a mixed-rate regime is compared. It is shown that China’s
pegging policy does affect the efficacy of U.S. macro policies, in part because
China uses the dollar as its main reserve currency. By recycling intervention
dollars into U.S. Treasury securities, China contributes to the “permanent” nature
of the bilateral current account imbalance.
It is also shown that growth spurts from China to the U.S. have positive
effects in the U.S. compared to growth spurts from the Eurozone. In the context of
the recent recession in the U.S., that may actually have been a desirable result of
China’s policy.
An important element in U.S.-China trade relations is the importance of
production networking and processing trade. These features are shown to affect
the nature and efficiency of trade-balance adjustment in ways that do not exist in
U.S. trade with the other countries in the model.
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